Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary

Documentos de trabajo en investigación socioeconómica

Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary

Fecha de publicación: 2021-10-19

Autores: Brassiolo, Pablo ; Estrada, Ricardo ; Fajardo, Gustavo ; Martínez-Correa, Julian

We show that bureaucrats can exploit discretion in hiring decisions to engage in forms of favoritism that hinder organizational performance. We do this in the context of the Mexican federal judiciary. The arrival of a judge at a circuit results in the hiring of 0.05 relatives to key staff positions within the following year on average, a figure which is probably a lower bound of the overall effect. Moreover, we find that the appointment of relatives of judges to a court’s staff leads to a reduction in the court’s productivity, which indicates that such hires are motivated by rent-seeking rather than by efficiency purposes. Importantly for personnel policy, nepotistic hires are concentrated among judges who have been sanctioned for administrative offenses, those assigned to courts located in their state of birth, and those in higher-ranking positions.

Idiomas disponibles

Actualmente solo contamos con la publicación en un idioma.

Ficha técnica

Idioma: en

País / Región: América Latina, México

Formato: pdf

Citar publicación

Brassiolo, Pablo; Estrada, Ricardo; Fajardo, Gustavo; Martínez-Correa, Julian. (2021). Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary. Caracas: CAF

Autores y autoras

Brassiolo, Pablo

Num. de publicaciones 36

Estrada, Ricardo

Num. de publicaciones 32

Fajardo, Gustavo

Num. de publicaciones 23

Martínez-Correa, Julian

Num. de publicaciones 2

Lecturas recomendadas