Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary

Documentos de trabalho de investigação socioeconómica

Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary

Data de publicação: 2021-10-19

Autores: Brassiolo, Pablo ; Estrada, Ricardo ; Fajardo, Gustavo ; Martínez-Correa, Julian

We show that bureaucrats can exploit discretion in hiring decisions to engage in forms of favoritism that hinder organizational performance. We do this in the context of the Mexican federal judiciary. The arrival of a judge at a circuit results in the hiring of 0.05 relatives to key staff positions within the following year on average, a figure which is probably a lower bound of the overall effect. Moreover, we find that the appointment of relatives of judges to a court’s staff leads to a reduction in the court’s productivity, which indicates that such hires are motivated by rent-seeking rather than by efficiency purposes. Importantly for personnel policy, nepotistic hires are concentrated among judges who have been sanctioned for administrative offenses, those assigned to courts located in their state of birth, and those in higher-ranking positions.

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Ficha técnica

Idioma: en

País / Região: América Latina, México

Formato: pdf

Citar publicação

Brassiolo, Pablo; Estrada, Ricardo; Fajardo, Gustavo; Martínez-Correa, Julian. (2021). Family Rules: Nepotism in the Mexican Judiciary. Caracas: CAF

Autores e autoras

Brassiolo, Pablo

Número de publicações 36

Estrada, Ricardo

Número de publicações 32

Fajardo, Gustavo

Número de publicações 23

Martínez-Correa, Julian

Número de publicações 2

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